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Abstract 
The role of acquisitions in the initial public offerings’ (IPOs’) performance has been studied 
widely in the U.S. but rather little within European markets. This thesis researches 5,052 
European IPOs from 1990 to 2009 to find out whether the acquisition activity influences the 
long-run performance of newly public firms. Using calendar and event-time approaches, I 
concluded that the post-IPO acquirers experience significantly poorer performance in the years 
2-6 after the issue compared to the non-acquirers group. The non-acquirers earn a Fama-French 
three-factor monthly alpha of 0.81% while acquirers earn only a monthly alpha of 0.19% during 
the period. The mean differences in cumulative returns for these groups supports this finding 
as they are significant for the years 4-6 after the IPO. The results confirm that the management 
of the IPO firms are exposed hubris and overconfidence when making acquisition decisions 
shortly after going public as well as investors are exposed to over optimism about these 
acquisitions. The results indicate as well that acquisitions play an important role in the well-
documented IPO long-run underperformance also in Europe. 
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1. Introduction and literature review 
1.1 Long-run underperformance of initial public offerings 
Initial public offering (IPO) long-run underperformance has been studied actively by many 
authors from the early 1990s. The question is often addressed as “IPO performance puzzle”, 
and since Ritter (1991) as well as Loughran and Ritter (1995) found evidence on the IPO 
underperformance, literature has tried to find explanations for the performance puzzle from 
many different angles. Ritter (1991) as well as Loughran and Ritter (1995) argued that issuers 
took advantage of “windows of opportunity” especially in the high IPO volume periods, by 
successfully timing their issues in periods when the IPO market was hot and their stock 
substantially overvalued.  
Prior studies raise also the significance of underwriters and venture capital backing in the 
IPO performance. The underwriter quality and IPO long-run underperformance were studied 
by Carter et al. (1998) and Dong et al. (2011) who both agreed that higher underwriter quality 
anticipates better long-run performance especially among IPOs with high uncertainty. Dong et 
al. (2011) emphasize the important marketing and certification/screening role of the underwriter 
to explain relation between the underwriter reputation and the long-run performance of the IPO. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) replicated the Loughran and Ritter (1995) results and discovered that 
venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs in the long-run. As a possible 
reason for this the authors suggest that individual investors have incomplete information or 
influenced by fads as non-venture-backed IPOs are more likely to be held by them. While the 
“windows of opportunity” hypothesis and venture-backing provide considerable insights into 
understanding of IPO underperformance, previous literature has also considered acquisitions as 
an important factor to explain the IPO performance puzzle. 
 
1.2 Acquisitions as a driver for the IPO underperformance 
Post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms has been studied by e.g. Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) who both concluded that many acquirers tend to 
underperform in the long-run. On the other hand, Brau and Fawcett (2006) studied motives for 
IPOs and surveyed 336 CFOs to interpret that the primary reason for going public is to create 
public shares for use in future acquisitions. Considering these two findings together, several 
researchers have studied the role of acquisition activity also in the IPO long-run 
underperformance. First of all, Brau et al. (2012) studied 3,547 IPOs from 1985 to 2003 and 
compared long-run returns of firms who did not make an acquisition during the first year after 
an IPO to those who made one or more acquisitions during the year. The results were 
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remarkable: the acquirer firms produced significantly poorer long-run returns than the non-
acquirers (Brau et al., 2012). To the best of my knowledge, this was the first study to consider 
the post-IPO acquisition activity as an explanatory factor for the IPO long-run 
underperformance.  
While Brau et al. (2012) considered all acquirers as a single group, other researches have 
also studied the frequency of acquisitions as a driver for post-acquisition and post-IPO 
performance. The frequent acquirers’ performance (not particularly IPO firms’) has been 
researched by many authors (e.g. Ismail, 2008 as well as Billett and Qian, 2008), who all stated 
that infrequent acquirers outperform frequent acquirers significantly. In addition, among others 
Celikyurt et al. (2010) inferred that a typical IPO firm makes four acquisitions within a five-
year period with expenditures substantially greater than their capital and research and 
development expenses. When the acquisition frequency as a driver for poorer performance and 
the Celikyurt et al. (2010) findings are linked together, we could have another factor to explain 
the IPO long-run underperformance: the high frequency of post-IPO acquisitions.  
At this point I have covered the existing literature on the the IPO long-run 
underperformance, the acquisition motive in going public and acquisition frequency as a driver 
for the post-IPO performance. Most comprehensively these issues covered Amor and Kooli 
(2016) in a recently published paper named “Do acquisitions affect IPO long-run performance? 
Evidence from single vs. multiple acquirers.” In the next chapter I discuss more about the details 
of this paper as it functions as the frame of reference for this Bachelor’s Thesis. 
Amor and Kooli (2016) accumulated a sample of 5,055 U.S. IPOs and tested whether non-
acquirers outperform acquirers and single acquirers outperform frequent acquirers in the long-
run. They used the same one year post-IPO acquisition window as Brau et al. (2012) and studied 
the firms’ performance during years 1-5 after the issue. They came to a conclusion that the 
frequent acquirers perform significantly worse than the single acquirers and noted (p. 3): “These 
findings suggest that the reported underperformance of IPO firms that make acquisitions in the 
first year comes mostly from firms that make more than one acquisition.” The findings were 
remarkable as to my best knowledge, no study had before raised the frequent (i.e. more than 
one) acquisitions as a main driver for the long-run IPO underperformance. The data and 
empirical methods used in this “reference paper” are covered in the following sections. As this 
thesis is focusing on the European markets, in the next chapter I cover the existing literature on 
European IPOs and acquisitions and their main differences compared to the U.S. markets. 
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1.3 European point of view 
To some extent, existing literature has recorded differences between European and U.S. 
IPO markets. Jay R. Ritter discussed the subject in a paper published in 2003 and made two 
major findings. The first was that European gross spreads are lower and less clustered than in 
U.S, which was, to my best knowledge, firstly found by S. Torstila in 2001. Besides this, in 
some European countries unlike in the U.S. it is typical to have when-issued trading prior to the 
final offering. Ritter (2003) notes that (p. 7) “All of these studies have found that the final offer 
price is adjusted in the direction implied by the when-issued market price, but the adjustment 
is fairly modest, especially for upward revisions.” Basically this could mean that within these 
European IPOs, the final offer price could be closer to the intrinsic value and thus the first 
trading day increase in the stock price would not be so significant as in the U.S. markets. The 
lower gross spreads Torstila (2001) and Ritter (2003) found could have same kind of effect in 
the short-term returns of the IPO. However, as this thesis focuses on the long-term returns of 
the European issuers starting from two years after the issue announcement date, these findings 
should not substantially impact the results. 
The motives for IPOs have been researched also in Europe. Bancel and Mittoo (2009) 
surveyed CFOs from 12 European countries and argued that in Europe there is no single theory 
that can explain the decision to go public as firms chase several benefits by the IPO. The 
motives for going public vary significantly along the firm and country characteristics, except 
that the enhanced visibility and prestige, funding for growth and financial flexibility are 
common within all European firms and countries (Bancel and Mittoo, 2009). They also found 
moderate support for the theory which emphasizes future mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as 
a major benefit in going public. Overall, the findings are more or less similar compared to the 
U.S. studies of IPO motives, so my hypotheses and methods will be quite similar to the Amor 
and Kooli (2016) paper. Next, I discuss about the hypotheses the existing literature have stated 
to explain the value destruction in acquisitions. 
 
1.4 Hypotheses explaining value-destroying acquisitions 
One of the first to address an explanation for the poor post-acquisition performance was 
Richard Roll (1986), who rationalized it with the classic “hubris hypothesis”. The hypothesis 
basically stated that the management of bidding firms are infected by hubris and pay simply too 
much for their targets as they believe unrealistically that they can manage the target firms’ 
assets more efficiently than the firms’ current management (Roll, 1986). Besides this, Titman 
et al. (2004) argued that when firm increases its investment expenditures (i.e. makes frequent 
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acquisitions), investors tend to underreact to the empire building implications, which results as 
a poor performance in the long-run. Over 20 years after Roll (1986) introduced the hubris 
hypothesis, Malmendier and Tate (2008) studied the CEO overconfidence in M&As and 
discovered that the market reaction for merger announcement was significantly more negative 
for overconfident than non-overconfident CEOs. Finally, they note (p. 23) as a continuum to 
the Roll (1986) research that: “However, overconfident CEOs are unambiguously more likely 
to make lower-quality acquisitions when their firm has abundant internal resources.” In the IPO 
coverage, newly public firms often have “abundant internal resources” accumulated by the 
issue, which means these hypotheses are very applicable for this thesis.  
An alternative angle to acquisitions is the so called “learning hypothesis” (Aktas et al., 
2011), which states that CEOs change their bidding behavior based on the investor reactions to 
the previous deals they have made. This was later confirmed by Aktas et al. (2013) as they note 
that multiple acquirers become more skillful by learning and secure larger benefits in following 
deals. This “learning hypothesis” is not completely in line with the hubris and overconfidence 
hypotheses discussed earlier as they both addressed acquisitions mainly as a value-destroying 
deals in the long-run. However, Aktas et. al (2011) noted that (p. 2) “The experience of the 
CEO in deal making affects the learning process, and both rational and hubristic CEOs learn on 
average from market signals.” In the light of this information, one could argue that the first 
acquisition a hubristic or overconfident CEO makes is the most value-destroying one as the 
management is not yet started its learning process. This also contradicts with Amor and Kooli 
(2016) who basically stated that the second acquisition was the most value-destroying one for 
the newly public acquirers.  
 
1.5 Scope and hypotheses of this thesis 
In this thesis, I ask if the acquisitions made after an IPO affect the issuer firms’ long-run 
performance in European countries. I will replicate the Amor and Kooli (2016) paper (as much 
is it reasonable for a Bachelor’s Thesis) on U.S. IPOs to find out whether the same effects apply 
also in the European markets. To be specific, I have two research questions: First is whether 
European post-IPO acquirers perform more poorly in the long-run than those firms who don’t 
acquire at all during the first two years after the issue. Secondly, I ask whether European 
infrequent post-IPO acquirers outperform frequent acquirers in the long-run. The questions are 
important to European company managements as well as investors who both benefit from the 
information if acquisitions truly affect the IPO long-run performance. The management of a 
newly public firm can use the information when they make the decisions to acquire. Investors 
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benefit from the information when they are contemplating to invest to an issuer firm with 
potentially high acquisition intentions. For academicians this study could strengthen the 
hypothesis of acquisitions’ significance in the long studied IPO puzzle. 
My main contribution to the existing literature is the fact that post-IPO behavior is not 
considerably studied in Europe. To my best knowledge, there is no studies in European markets 
which consider acquisition activity after the issue as a driver for the IPO long-run 
underperformance. As the results in U.S. have been significant (Brau et al., 2012 and Amor and 
Kooli, 2016) it is valuable to find out whether the same effects apply also in Europe considering 
its slightly different acquisition behavior compared to U.S. (Torstila, 2001 and Ritter, 2003). 
Based on the literature discussed earlier, I expect, similar to Amor and Kooli (2016), that new 
issuers in Europe are subject to hubris and overconfidence when they decide to implement the 
several acquisitions. While I assume the issuers to be overconfident, I hypothesize the IPO 
investors to be overoptimistic about the decisions to acquire within the two years following the 
IPO. Thus, the more acquisitions an IPO firm makes, the less performance they earn in the long-
run. To estimate the long-run performance I use calendar time (following Amor and Kooli, 
2016) and event-time approaches, which are discussed thoroughly in Section 3.  
Accumulating a sample of 5052 European IPOs from 1990 to 2009 I find out that the issuers 
who did not make acquisitions during the first two years after the IPO outperformed 
significantly in the long-run those firms that acquired during the same period. The calendar-
time approach showed significant monthly Fama-French (1993) three-factor model abnormal 
returns within the period, which did not appear in the acquirers group. The results in the event-
time approach support this finding as the mean differences in returns are significant between 
the non-acquirers and acquirers for the years 4, 5 and 6 following the issue. However, the 
infrequent and frequent acquirers’ performance comparison did not yield any significant results 
on either method. These findings indicate that the acquisitions of newly public firms are an 
explanatory factor for the IPO long-run underperformance in Europe. 
The thesis is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss about the data and method of the 
study, Section 3 presents the methods for calculating the performance and shows the empirical 
results, while Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. Data and method 
2.1 Data description 
I gathered all IPOs made by European firms from 1.1.1990 to 31.12.2009 using Thomson 
SDC New Issues database. I identified a firm to be European based on its nation information in 
the database including also e.g. Turkey and Russia. The start of my 20-year period for IPOs 
was chosen as 1990 was the first year in Europe to get sufficient amount of IPOs for my 
empirical analysis. The total amount of IPOs within this period in Europe in the database was 
10,299.  
After acquiring the IPO data, I gathered all acquisitions made by these IPO firms during 
1.1.1990-31.12.2011 as the time window for acquisitions was 2 years after IPO announcement 
date. To gather the acquisition data, I used the Thomson SDC database and utilized SEDOL-
codes to identify the IPO firms. After removing all firms not having a SEDOL and removing 
duplicate SEDOL codes, my IPO sample size decreased to 7,614. The decision to use the 
SEDOL-codes was based on the fact that it was the most widely used identifier in Europe (in 
the databases I used) and the sample size remained large enough for the analysis. The 
acquisition sample comprised a total of 60,294 transactions made by these 7,614 firms during 
1.1.1990-31.12.2011. I removed all acquisitions with less than 50% of acquired shares as these 
minority-share acquisitions may not have as much impact on the firms’ operations 
(unfortunately 16,170 of the acquisitions did not have this information in the database).  
Differently than Amor and Kooli (2016) the post-IPO acquisition period I studied was 2 years 
to get larger and even-sized groups and subgroups of firms for the empirical analysis. 
To acquire the IPO firms’ stock prices, I used Datastream’s Total Return Index. I chose the 
time period for estimating the issuers’ long-run performance to be four years similar to Amor 
and Kooli (2016). However, as my acquisition window was two years, my period for the returns 
was months 25-72 after the IPO (Amor and Kooli used months 13-60 as their acquisition-
window was one year). I acquired monthly prices from January 1992 to December 2015 for all 
the 7,614 firms once again using their SEDOL-codes. After removing all firms not having return 
data for months 25-72 after the IPO or having zero returns within these months my final number 
of firms in the analysis was 5,052. The drop of 2,562 in the sample size at this point was quite 
large but anticipated as identification of firms between the databases is always complicated. 
Besides this, the Total Return Index data in Datastream proved to be somewhat incomplete for 
particular European submarkets. However, I concluded that the sample of 5,052 firms was large 
enough for my empirical analysis and that it would have been highly time consuming to 
manually search the missing data in order to increase the sample.  In addition, I gathered 
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monthly STOXX Europe 600 Index from the Datastream as an estimate for market return as 
well as monthly Fama & French (1993) European three factors and T-bill rates from Kenneth 
R. French Data Library for the same period. 
 
2.2 Sample distribution 
First, I formed two groups from the final sample of 5,052 IPO firms based on their 
acquisition amounts during the first two years following the issue announcement date. The other 
of these groups are all the issuer firms who did not make an acquisition in the first two years 
following the IPO, which I name “non-acquirers”. Of the 5,052 firms, 2,766 (54.75%) applied 
to this criterion. The remaining firms, which made at least one acquisition during the first two 
years after the IPO, I specify as “acquirers”. In my sample, there were a total of 2,286 (45.25%) 
firms who acquired during the first two post-IPO years. 
Secondly, I wanted to study the acquisition behavior within the group of “acquirers” so I 
formed two subgroups based on how many acquisitions they made during the two years. The 
other group was all the acquirers who made one or two acquisitions during the two years, which 
I call “infrequent acquirers”. Of the 2,286 acquirers, 1,415 (28.01% of the total sample and 
61.90% of the acquirers) applied to this criterion. The other subgroup, all the firms who made 
three or more acquisitions during the first two years after the IPO, I specify as “frequent 
acquirers”. The total number of infrequent acquirers in my sample was 871 (17.24% of the total 
sample and 38.10% of the acquirers).  
The groups were very similar to the Amor and Kooli (2016) study as they formed also two 
groups and two subgroups based on the acquisition activity. Basically the only differences were 
my acquisition window period and the definition of infrequent and frequent acquirers as Amor 
and Kooli (2016) designated infrequent acquirers as firms with one acquisition and frequent 
acquirers as firms with two or more acquisitions during the acquisition window. I concluded 
that these groups together with the longer acquisition window would suit the European IPO and 
acquisition markets better as I got nearly equally sized firm samples for my analysis. The terms 
“non-acquirers”, “acquirers”, “infrequent acquirers” and “frequent acquirers” defined above are 
used throughout this thesis. The acquisitions the IPO firms’ made during the first two years 
following the IPO are named as “post-IPO acquisitions” in this paper. 
 
2.3 Sample tables 
Table 1 presents the annual distribution of the whole sample of the thesis and the three 
distinct groups; non-acquirers, infrequent acquirers and frequent acquirers (I decided to drop 
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the acquirers group out from the tables 1, 2 and 3 as it can be integrated from its two subgroups). 
First of all, the number of IPOs varies considerably over time. The table shows that the largest 
increase in IPO numbers in Europe was in 1994 as the year’s 286 IPOs was over four times 
more than in any of the years 1990-1993 IPO volumes. The table shows clearly that the years 
1990-1993 European IPO market was to some extent undeveloped. However, when the IPO 
levels increased suddenly in 1994 they haven’t grown substantially since on a yearly basis. In 
this sample, the highest levels of IPOs were identified during the peak of the Dot-com bubble 
in 1999-2000 (a total of 969 IPOs during the two years) and in the end of the economic boom 
in 2007 (547 IPOs). My sample period ends in the year 2009, but the IPO in Europe volumes 
have dropped substantially since as the 2008 financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis burst (Ritter 
et al., 2012). 
Besides the IPO volumes, the European acquisition activity in the two years following the 
IPO varies over time. The mean number of acquisitions made during the two years after the 
IPO varies from 0.774 (2001) to 2.352 (1999). The number acquirers (both infrequent and 
frequent) follow a growing trend from the year 1990 (10 acquirers) to 2000 (254 acquirers). 
The share of acquirers of the year’s IPO firms varies from 34.13% in year 2009 to 57.32% in 
year 1999. The yearly average share of firms who became acquirers in the first two years 
following the IPO is 43.83%. As with IPOs, the highest post-IPO acquisition levels (amount of 
post-IPO acquisitions) are observed during the Dot-com bubble in 1997-2000 and during the 
economic boom in 2005-2009. Based on this sample it can be stated that the prevailing 
economic conditions affect both, firms’ IPO and acquisition activity also in Europe.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the nations where the IPO firms are from. The countries 
and other independent regions are based on the firms’ nation information provided by Thomson 
SDC database. First of all, it can be seen that unsurprisingly, a large amount of 1,797 (35.57%) 
IPOs in the sample were made in United Kingdom. After UK, the next largest IPO amounts 
were in France, 601 (11.90%), and in Germany, 591 (11.70%) IPOs during the period. The 15 
countries or regions1 having less than 10 IPO firms in the sample, are combined as “Other”. 
There is a high variability in the post-IPO acquisition activity within the European countries. 
In Turkey, only 18,07% of IPO firms became acquirers in the first two years, the mean number 
of acquisitions in this period being 0.34. The highest post-IPO acquisition activity was distinctly 
in Russia with an average of 4.42 acquisitions during the first two post-IPO years. 
The Russian acquisitions were studied by Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) concluding that  
 
1The countries and regions having 1 to 10 IPO firms in the sample were Faroe Islands (1 IPO), Greenland (1), Slovak Rep (1), Slovenia (1), 
Iceland (2), Malta (2), Gibraltar (3), Latvia (4), Ukraine (4), Croatia (5), Romania (7), Czech Republic (8), Estonia (8), and Lithuania (9) 
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Russian M&A market has grown rapidly during the 21st century and on 2010, the country was 
responsible for 14% of the total emerging market M&A deals. The highest shares of acquirers 
of total IPO firms were in Russia (69.09%), Spain (63.64%) and Netherlands (61.83%).  
 
 
Table 1
Distribution by IPO year
IPO year Number of 
IPOs
% of total 
IPOs
Number of 
non-
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Number of 
infrequent 
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Number of 
frequent 
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Mean number of 
acquisitions 
during the first two 
years after IPO
1990 19 0.38 % 9 47.37 % 7 36.84 % 3 15.79 % 1.105
1991 63 1.25 % 40 63.49 % 11 17.46 % 12 19.05 % 1.587
1992 52 1.03 % 32 61.54 % 13 25.00 % 7 13.46 % 0.942
1993 61 1.21 % 39 63.93 % 15 24.59 % 7 11.48 % 1.033
1994 280 5.54 % 146 52.14 % 95 33.93 % 39 13.93 % 1.243
1995 200 3.96 % 115 57.50 % 50 25.00 % 35 17.50 % 1.195
1996 255 5.05 % 118 46.27 % 96 37.65 % 41 16.08 % 1.286
1997 310 6.14 % 170 54.84 % 85 27.42 % 55 17.74 % 1.319
1998 347 6.87 % 154 44.38 % 98 28.24 % 95 27.38 % 1.965
1999 403 7.98 % 172 42.68 % 112 27.79 % 119 29.53 % 2.352
2000 566 11.20 % 312 55.12 % 135 23.85 % 119 21.02 % 1.534
2001 261 5.17 % 165 63.22 % 75 28.74 % 21 8.05 % 0.774
2002 127 2.51 % 74 58.27 % 36 28.35 % 17 13.39 % 0.858
2003 115 2.28 % 70 60.87 % 29 25.22 % 16 13.91 % 0.965
2004 269 5.32 % 162 60.22 % 72 26.77 % 35 13.01 % 0.937
2005 277 5.48 % 152 54.87 % 74 26.71 % 51 18.41 % 1.271
2006 472 9.34 % 247 52.33 % 135 28.60 % 90 19.07 % 1.441
2007 547 10.83 % 320 58.50 % 172 31.44 % 55 10.05 % 0.921
2008 220 4.35 % 132 60.00 % 59 26.82 % 29 13.18 % 1.386
2009 208 4.12 % 137 65.87 % 46 22.12 % 25 12.02 % 0.995
Total 5,052 100.00 % 2,766 54.75 % 1,415 28.01 % 871 17.24 % 1.341
Table 2
Country distribution
Country or 
region
Number of 
IPOs
% of IPOs Number of 
non-
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Number of 
infrequent 
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Number of 
frequent 
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Mean number of 
acquisitions 
during the first two 
years after IPO
Austria 77 1.52 % 34 44.16 % 22 28.57 % 21 27.27 % 1.701
Belgium 88 1.74 % 50 56.82 % 22 25.00 % 16 18.18 % 1.443
Bulgaria 15 0.30 % 10 66.67 % 4 26.67 % 1 6.67 % 0.533
Cyprus 13 0.26 % 5 38.46 % 4 30.77 % 4 30.77 % 1.923
Denmark 134 2.65 % 86 64.18 % 34 25.37 % 14 10.45 % 0.836
Finland 83 1.64 % 33 39.76 % 29 34.94 % 21 25.30 % 1.855
France 601 11.90 % 334 55.57 % 153 25.46 % 114 18.97 % 1.501
Germany 591 11.70 % 314 53.13 % 161 27.24 % 116 19.63 % 1.438
Greece 132 2.61 % 94 71.21 % 22 16.67 % 16 12.12 % 0.697
Guernsey 55 1.09 % 36 65.45 % 17 30.91 % 2 3.64 % 0.527
Hungary 16 0.32 % 9 56.25 % 5 31.25 % 2 12.50 % 1.313
Ireland-Rep 58 1.15 % 27 46.55 % 15 25.86 % 16 27.59 % 1.793
Isle of Man 36 0.71 % 26 72.22 % 7 19.44 % 3 8.33 % 0.528
Italy 226 4.47 % 125 55.31 % 70 30.97 % 31 13.72 % 1.221
Jersey 25 0.49 % 16 64.00 % 8 32.00 % 1 4.00 % 0.480
Luxembourg 11 0.22 % 7 63.64 % 1 9.09 % 3 27.27 % 2.091
Netherlands 131 2.59 % 50 38.17 % 28 21.37 % 53 40.46 % 2.878
Norway 135 2.67 % 73 54.07 % 37 27.41 % 25 18.52 % 1.289
Poland 158 3.13 % 98 62.03 % 50 31.65 % 10 6.33 % 0.671
Portugal 40 0.79 % 22 55.00 % 8 20.00 % 10 25.00 % 1.275
Russian Fed 55 1.09 % 17 30.91 % 16 29.09 % 22 40.00 % 4.418
Spain 99 1.96 % 36 36.36 % 39 39.39 % 24 24.24 % 2.121
Sweden 195 3.86 % 105 53.85 % 51 26.15 % 39 20.00 % 1.549
Switzerland 142 2.81 % 77 54.23 % 37 26.06 % 28 19.72 % 1.387
Turkey 83 1.64 % 68 81.93 % 12 14.46 % 3 3.61 % 0.337
United 
Kingdom
1797 35.57 % 978 54.42 % 546 30.38 % 273 15.19 % 1.205
Other 56 1.11 % 36 64.29 % 17 30.36 % 3 5.36 % 0.696
Total 5,052 100.00 % 2,766 54.75 % 1,415 28.01 % 871 17.24 % 1.341
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Table 3 presents the industry distribution of the sample firms based on the SIC codes in 
Thomson SDC database. Most of the European IPO firms in the sample, a total of 76,52%, are 
in Manufacturing (1,530 firms), Finance, insurance and real estate (1,221 firms) and Services 
industries (1,122 firms). Excluding “Other” industry (only 5 firms), the mean number of 
acquisitions in the first two post-IPO years vary between industries from 0.986 in the Finance, 
insurance and real estate industry to 1.845 in the Transportation, communication and sanitary 
services industry.  The largest share of acquirers of total IPO firms is in Services (54.81%), 
Construction (54.10%) and Transportation, communication and sanitary services industries 
(52.93%). The distribution of frequent acquirers is quite similar as can be seen in the table. The 
industry distribution of acquisition activity in this thesis’ sample is in line with the findings by 
e.g. C. Ciborra (1991), which state that high-tech industries prefer strategic alliances over 
M&As as in those environments learning and flexibility are important. On the other hand, for 
low-tech industries M&As tend to be the dominant as learning and flexibility are not so crucial 
in their operative environment (Ciborra, 1991).  
 
 
 
To estimate the long-run performance of IPO firms I used two different methods. As a 
calendar-time approach, I used alphas from the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, which 
is based on the Amor and Kooli (2016) research. As an event-time approach I applied 
cumulative average returns and cumulative average abnormal returns with the Sharpe and 
Lintner (1964 and 1965) Capital Asset Pricing Model. As an event-time approach, Amor and 
Kooli (2016) calculated cumulative average abnormal returns and buy and hold returns based 
on three benchmarks: the value-weighted CRSP index; a sample of firms matched by industry, 
size and book-to-market ratio and a sample of firms matched using PSM. I decided to exclude 
this method from my thesis and use the non-adjusted and CAPM risk-adjusted returns for the 
Table 3
Industry distribution
Industry 2-Digit 
SIC
Numbe
r of 
IPOs
% of total 
IPOs
Number of 
non-
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Number of 
infrequent 
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Number of 
frequent 
acquirers
% of the 
year's IPO 
firms
Mean number of 
acquisitions 
during the first two 
years after IPO
Agriculture 01-09 20 0.40 % 14 70.00 % 2 10.00 % 4 20.00 % 1.300
Natural resource 10-14 235 4.65 % 132 56.17 % 68 28.94 % 35 14.89 % 1.289
Construction 15-17 122 2.41 % 56 45.90 % 43 35.25 % 23 18.85 % 1.525
Manufacturing 20-39 1530 30.29 % 856 55.95 % 436 28.50 % 238 15.56 % 1.214
Transportation, 40-49 427 8.45 % 201 47.07 % 130 30.44 % 96 22.48 % 1.845communication 
and
sanitary services
Wholesale and 50-59 370 7.32 % 203 54.86 % 108 29.19 % 59 15.95 % 1.292
retail trade
Finance, insurance 60-67 1221 24.17 % 793 64.95 % 280 22.93 % 148 12.12 % 0.986
and real estate
Services 70-89 1122 22.21 % 507 45.19 % 347 30.93 % 268 23.89 % 1.722
Other 90-99 5 0.10 % 4 80.00 % 1 20.00 % 0 0.00 % 0.400
Total 5,052 100.00 % 2,766 54.75 % 1,415 28.01 % 871 17.24 % 1.341
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event-time approach instead, because finding all the sample firms would have been too time 
consuming in the scope of this thesis. Both, calendar-time and event-time approaches are 
discussed thoroughly in the next section. 
3. Empirical testing and results 
In this section, I present thoroughly both methods I used to determine the IPO firms’ long 
run performance and compare these results with the two groups and two subgroups defined 
earlier. With both approaches, I discuss first the results between the non-acquirers and acquirers 
and then between infrequent and frequent acquirers. I consider the first two years after the IPO 
as the acquisition window, so my period for return calculations for each firm include years 2 to 
6 after the IPO. In many occasions, the firm faced delisting, bankruptcy or just problem with 
the data availability during these years. As these were not sorted out in Datastream (instead 
they appear as zeros in returns), I assumed that they will not significantly affect my results when 
comparing the different groups. I recognize that the abnormal returns may be slightly biased 
due to this assumption but the comparison between the firm groups is still solid.  
All the firms’ monthly returns in this thesis are calculated with the following formula: 
     
(1)       𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
− 1 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of stock i during period t, 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the Total Return Index (from 
Datastream) of firm i during period t and 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is the Total Return Index of the same firm 
one period before period t. 
 
3.1 Calendar-time approach 
I applied the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model to evaluate the European IPO firms’ 
long-run performance. First, I calculated the monthly returns for each IPO firm between months 
25-72 as the months 1-24 acted as my acquisition window. I formed four portfolios of the total 
sample: non-acquirers, acquirers, infrequent acquirers and frequent acquirers (defined earlier) 
and calculated their equally weighted average returns (Amor and Kooli used value weighted 
average returns but again due to time limitations equally weighted portfolios was more 
reasonable choice for this purpose). I used Fama-French (1993) European monthly three-factors 
from the Kenneth R. French Data Library as my estimates for the model. For Europe, there 
were no country or firm specific factors available, so I decided that the European factors are 
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sufficient for this study because the European countries1 included in calculating these factors 
represent 90.36% of my IPO sample. With the equally weighted portfolio average returns, and 
the European Fama and French (1993) factors, I estimated the following regression: 
 
(2)       𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the monthly return of an equally weighted calendar-time portfolio of IPO firms, 
𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the one month T-bill rate, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on an European value-weight portfolio, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 
is the equal-weight average of the returns on European three small stock portfolios minus the 
average of the returns on the region’s three big stock portfolios, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the equal-weight 
average of the returns for European two high book-to-market portfolios minus the average 
returns of the region’s two low book-to-market portfolios. 
First, as shown in Panel A of Table 4, the whole IPO sample’s mean monthly calendar-time 
abnormal returns for the period were 0.53%, which is not in line with the IPO long-run 
underperformance discussed earlier. However, this result is statistically significant only at the 
10% level. The abnormal returns may also be slightly biased due to the survivorship bias, which 
was discussed in the beginning of this section. The Panels B and C show the comparison 
between non-acquirers and acquirers; the non-acquirers yield positive monthly abnormal 
returns of 0.81% (significant at the 1% level), while the acquirers have non-significant monthly 
abnormal returns of 0.19%. This is in line with the hypothesis that post-IPO acquisitions affect 
negatively on IPO long-run performance. 
The results in Panels D and E show the abnormal returns of infrequent and frequent 
acquirers. Infrequent acquirers have a mean monthly abnormal returns of 0.16% and frequent 
acquirers 0.18%, both of them insignificant. With these subgroups, I cannot interpret that the 
number of acquisitions during the first two years after the IPO would affect the firms’ long-run 
performance in European countries. This result contradicts with the Amor and Kooli (2016)’s 
statement that most of the post-IPO acquirers’ underperformance would come from the frequent 
acquirers. The finding may also result from the differences between European and U.S. IPO 
and acquisition cultures. 
As shown in the table, none of the five groups’ HML factors are significant, which may 
result from the original factors. The Adjusted R-squared values are as well rather small, which  
 
1The European countries included in calculating the Fama-French three-factors were Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. 
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may be caused by the same reason. Even though the countries, which are included in the factor 
calculations, represent 90.36% of my IPO sample, the factors may still be somewhat biased for 
these firms. Therefore, further analysis with more accurate Fama-French factors would be 
necessary for the following studies. 
Overall, according to the calendar approach with Fama and French (1993) three factor 
model, the best performing IPO firms in Europe do not acquire in the first two years after the 
issue. However, whether a firm does 1 to 2 or 3 or more acquisitions during this period, does 
not affect its long-run performance. 
 
 
 
3.2 Event-time approach 
As in the calendar-time approach, within this approach I focus on the IPO performance for 
months 25-72 after the issue announcement. In the event-time approach, I calculated non-
adjusted cumulative average returns (CAR) and CAPM risk-adjusted cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) for all the firms in the sample. Both of these cumulative returns are 
Table 4
Calendar-time approach: Fama-French three-factor model reression results
Factors Model characteristics
Alpha RMRF SMB HML Adjusted R-squared F-stat
Panel A: Equal weighted calendar-time portfolio (all sample)
Estimate 0.0053 0.2631 0.9002 0.0667 18.25 % 22.14**
t-Statistics 1.910* 4.589*** 7.326*** 0.589
Panel B: Equal weighted calendar-time portfolio (non-acquirers)
Estimate 0.0081 0.2497 0.8853 0.0302 16.73 % 20.02**
t-Statistics 2.826*** 4.265*** 7.056*** 0.261
Panel C: Equal weighted calendar-time portfolio (acquirers)
Estimate 0.0019 0.2671 0.9071 0.1190 16.68 % 19.95**
t-Statistics 0.625 4.344*** 6.882*** 0.979
Panel D: Equal weighted calendar-time portfolio (infrequent acquirers)
Estimate 0.0016 0.2567 0.8827 0.1414 15.90 % 18.90**
t-Statistics 0.532 4.167*** 6.683*** 1.161
Panel E: Equal weighted calendar-time portfolio (frequent acquirers)
Estimate 0.0018 0.2735 0.9132 0.1165 13.34 % 15.57**
t-Statistics 0.522 3.889*** 6.058*** 0.838
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
This table shows the results from Fama-French (1993) three-factor model regression. Monthly returns on the five portfolios are
calculated from month 25 to 72 after the IPO. The dependent variable is the difference between monthly return on equally weighted
calendar-time portfolio and the monthly return on the 3-month T-bill. The independent variables are (1) RMRF is the difference of
European value-weight market portfolio and the monthly return on the 3-month T-bill; (2) SMB is the difference of equal-weight
average of the returns on European three small stock portfolios on the average of the returns on the region’s three big stock
portfolios, and (3) HML is the difference of equal-weight average of the returns for European two high book-to-market portfolios and
the average returns of the region’s two low book-to-market portfolios. Alpha is the intercept term and represents the mean monthly
excess returns on the calendar time portfolio. Panel A presents the estimates for all IPOs. Panel B and C reports the regression
results for the non-acquirers and acquirers, respectively. Panel D and E show estimates for the infrequent and frequent acquirers,
respectively. The results for t-statistic, adjusted R-squared and F-stat are documented for each model.
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calculated for four periods, for years 3 (months 25-36), 4 (25-48), 5 (25-60) and 6 (25-72) after 
the IPO. The CAR from month q to month s is defined as: 
 
(3)       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑞,𝑠 = ∑ 𝐴𝑣𝑅𝑡
𝑠
𝑡=𝑞
 
where  
(4)       𝐴𝑣𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
𝑡=𝑞
 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑅𝑡 is the average return (non-risk-adjusted) for the portfolio for the month t and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the 
monthly return of the stock i (defined in the beginning of this chapter).  
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from month q to month s are calculated 
according to the following formulas: 
 
(5)       𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑞,𝑠 = ∑ 𝐴𝑣𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑠
𝑡=𝑞
 
where 
(6)       𝐴𝑣𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
𝑡=𝑞
 
 
and the 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is calculated for each month with the original CAPM formula: 
 
(7)       𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) 
=> 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) 
    
𝐴𝑣𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the average abnormal return of the portfolio for the month t and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly 
abnormal return for firm i during month t. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 in the CAPM formula has the same definition as 
earlier,  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the is the one month T-bill rate (as in the calendar-time approach) and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is 
the return for STOXX Europe 600 Index for the month t. 𝛽𝑖 is calculated for each individual 
firm against the STOXX Europe 600 Index and is defined as: 
 
 
The impact of acquisition activity on IPO long-run performance: Evidence from Europe. 
 
 16 
 
(8)       𝛽𝑖 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚)
 
 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the returns for the firm i for months 25 to 72 after the IPO and 𝑅𝑚 is the returns for 
STOXX Europe 600 Index for the same months. 
Table 5 and 6 show the results for both CAR and CAAR calculations. The Table 5 focuses 
on the differences between non-acquirers and acquirers and the Table 6 on the differences 
between frequent and infrequent acquirers. In Panel A of the Table 5 are the variances and 
means CAR and CAAR values for the whole IPO sample. The average returns for the sample 
grow quite steadily after the third post-IPO year (third year return is -0.01%). Yearly average 
return for the whole sample for years 2-6 after the IPO is 5.85%. 
Panels B and C of the Table 5 present the performance comparison between the non-
acquirers and acquirers. The means of CAR and CAAR returns show that already in the third 
year after the issue (right after the acquisition window is closed), these groups’ cumulative 
returns start to differentiate from each other as non-acquirers yield positive and acquirers 
negative returns. The Panel D presents the mean difference of these groups and its t-statistic. 
The non-acquirers seem to outperform acquirers in every of the four research periods as the 
CAR mean difference grows from 0.1299 to 0.2564 in the four-year period. The CAAR mean 
difference acts similar way as it grows from 0.1298 to 0.2410. The cumulative average returns 
of non-acquirers in the year 6 are over three times larger than the acquirers’ returns. The 
difference in CAR means between non-acquirers and acquirers in years 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6 are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The difference in CAAR means between these groups 
in years 2-4 is significant at the 5% level and in years 2-5 and 2-6 is significant at the 1% level. 
Based on this information, it seems that the non-acquirers outperform acquirers during years 2-
4, 2-5 and 2-6 after the IPO. This is in line with the results of the calendar-time approach 
presented earlier and with the original hypothesis that the post-IPO acquisitions could explicate 
the long-run IPO underperformance.  
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The Table 6 presents the performance comparison between mean returns of infrequent and 
frequent acquirers. As seen in the Panel A and Panel B of the table, the cumulative average 
returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns of both of these subgroups sunk in the 
third year after the IPO. However, there is a notable difference between the subgroups, as 
infrequent acquirers have a negative third year return of -3.70% and the frequent acquirers a 
return of -13.70% in the same year. The CAPM cumulative abnormal returns of these two 
subgroups are even lower throughout the studied period. After the third year drop, the returns 
start to grow quite steadily towards the sixth post-IPO year, whereupon infrequent acquirers 
have a CAR of 15.80% and frequent acquirers a CAR of 4.49%. The mean difference in CAR 
and CAAR of the two subgroups remain between 0.0986 and 0.1367 for the four-year period. 
Even though there are clearly differences in the subgroups’ long-run performance, none of the 
CAR or CAAR mean differences are statistically significant. This is not in line with the 
hypothesis that frequent acquisitions during the first two years after the IPO would affect the 
issuers’ long-run performance. On the other hand, it is in line with my calendar-time approach 
presented earlier, which didn’t find any statistically significant results in the performance of 
these two subgroups. 
 
Table 5
Years 2-3 Years 2-4 Years 2-5 Years 2-6
CAR 2,3 CAAR 2,3 CAR 2,4 CAAR 2,4 CAR 2,5 CAAR 2,5 CAR 2,6 CAAR 2,6
Panel A: all sample
N 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052
Variance 0.474 0.494 1.059 1.132 1.610 1.688 2.049 2.128
Mean (%) -0.01 % -2.13 % 6.82 % 2.93 % 14.16 % 8.11 % 25.53 % 16.29 %
Panel B: non-acquirers
N 2,766 2,766 2,766 2,766 2,766 2,766 2,766 2,766
Variance 0.512 0.545 1.110 1.160 1.790 1.839 2.404 2.444
Mean (%) 5.87 % 3.75 % 14.81 % 10.81 % 24.94 % 18.70 % 37.13 % 27.19 %
Panel C: acquirers
N 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286
Variance 0.419 0.423 0.980 1.081 1.362 1.477 1.584 1.714
Mean (%) -7.12 % -9.23 % -2.84 % -6.60 % 1.11 % -4.71 % 11.49 % 3.09 %
Panel D: Mean difference tests non-acquirers vs. acquirers
Mean difference 0.1299 0.1298 0.1765 0.1741 0.2383 0.2341 0.2564 0.2410
t-statistics 1.560 1.524 2.657*** 2.482** 3.922*** 3.704*** 3.957*** 3.488***
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
This table shows the non-adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) and the CAPM risk-adjusted cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAAR) from 2 to 6 years after the IPO (excluding the first two years after the issue). For example, CAR2,5 is the
cumulative average return from month 25 to 60 following the IPO. Panel A presents CAR and CAAR for all IPO firms. Panel B reports
CAR and CAAR for non-acquirers and acquirers (defined earlier). The sample size, variance and the means of returns are presented
for all groups. T-statistic for difference in means test are given in Panel D.
Event-time approach, non-acquirers vs. acquirers: Non-adjusted cumulative average returns (CAR) and CAPM risk-adjusted 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) excluding the first two years
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In Figure 1 is presented the non-adjusted cumulative average returns (CAR) on the whole 
sample, non-acquirers, acquirers, infrequent acquirers and frequent acquirers. The figure shows 
clearly that only group of issuers, of which CAR grows steadily in years 2 to 6 after the IPO, is 
the non-acquirers. The acquirers’ CAR begins to grow steadily after the month 59, so they are 
clearly underperforming the years 2-5 after the IPO. As for the subgroups, it is also distinct that 
infrequent acquirers produce better cumulative returns than the frequent acquirers, especially 
in the months 25 to 45 after the IPO, even though these differences were not significant in any 
year. 
 
Table 6
Years 2-3 Years 2-4 Years 2-5 Years 2-6
CAR 2,3 CAAR 2,3 CAR 2,4 CAAR 2,4 CAR 2,5 CAAR 2,5 CAR 2,6 CAAR 2,6
Panel A: infrequent acquirers
N 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415
Variance 0.428 0.425 0.848 0.899 1.381 1.426 1.639 1.729
Mean (%) -3.07 % -5.47 % 1.94 % -2.37 % 6.32 % 0.27 % 15.80 % 7.22 %
Panel B: frequent acquiers
N 871 871 871 871 871 871 871 871
Variance 0.396 0.413 1.185 1.371 1.320 1.550 1.489 1.685
Mean (%) -13.70 % -15.34 % -10.62 % -13.48 % -7.35 % -12.80 % 4.49 % -3.61 %
Panel C:  Mean difference tests infrequent acquirers vs. frequent acquirers
Mean difference 0.1063 0.0986 0.1257 0.1111 0.1367 0.1307 0.1131 0.1082
t-statistics 0.228 -0.049 0.580 0.235 0.735 0.582 0.245 0.147
This table shows the non-adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) and the CAPM risk-adjusted cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAAR) from 2 to 6 years after the IPO (excluding the first two years after the issue) for infrequent and frequent
acquirers (defined earlier). Panel A and B reports CAR and CAAR for infrequent and frequent acquirers, respectively. The sample size,
variance and the means of returns are presented for both subgroups. T-statistic for difference in means test are given in Panel C.
Event-time approach, infrequent acquirers vs. frequent acquirers: Non-adjusted cumulative average returns (CAR) and CAPM 
risk-adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) excluding the first two years
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The reference study (Amor and Kooli, 2016) used several robustness checks to confirm the 
results. Worthwhile robustness check would have been e.g. to control the IPO and acquisition 
waves in the regression to find out that would acquisitions affect the IPO long-run performance 
also outside the “hot periods” such as the Dot-com bubble in 1997-2001. In the scope of this 
thesis due to time limitations, I decided to cut out the robustness checks of my analysis. 
However, for extra analysis it would be relevant to check whether the findings of this thesis are 
still significant after applying the robustness checks. 
4. Conclusion 
The previous literature does not consider acquisitions as a driver for the IPO long-run 
underperformance in Europe as it is studied quite extensively in the U.S. In this thesis, I 
compared the long-run performance of post-IPO non-acquirers and acquirers and likewise the 
performance of infrequent acquirers and frequent acquirers. I used a sample of 5,052 European 
IPOs in between 1990 and 2009 and included all the acquisitions the issuer completed during 
the first two years after the IPO. I examined the post-IPO performance for the years 2-6 after 
the issue.  
Both of the approaches I used produced similar results. The calendar-time approach using 
the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model results a monthly alpha of 0.81% (t-stat = 2.826), 
which is significant at the 1% level for the non-acquirers, compared to a monthly alpha of 0.19% 
(t-stat = 0.625) for the acquirers. Results of the event-time approach using cumulative average 
returns (CAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) supports this finding. Within 
years 2-6 after the issue, non-acquirers face a CAR of 37.13% (CAAR = 27.19%) while 
acquirers’ CAR in the same period was 11.49% (CAAR = 3.09%). The mean differences 
between these two groups are statistically significant at the 1% level for both CAR and CAAR 
within this period. Based on these findings, the European newly public acquirers appear to 
experience significantly worse performance in the six years after the IPO than the non-
acquirers. This finding of European issuers is in line with the U.S. studies made by Brau et al. 
(2012) and Amor and Kooli (2016) both concluding that the acquisitions affect negatively on 
the IPO long-run performance. However, there were no significant findings considering the 
difference between the performance of infrequent and frequent acquirers. Therefore, 
inconsistent with Amor and Kooli (2016), it seems that for Europe the reported 
underperformance of IPO firms that make acquisitions does not mostly come from firms that 
make frequent acquisitions. 
The impact of acquisition activity on IPO long-run performance: Evidence from Europe. 
 
 20 
I explain the findings with Roll (1986)’s hubris hypothesis together with Malmendier and 
Tate (2008)’s findings about CEO overconfidence. The hubris hypothesis argues that the 
management of bidding firms pay too much for their targets as they are infected by hubris, 
thinking that they can manage the firm more efficiently than its current management. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) supports this hypothesis as they note that the overconfident CEOs 
make the lower-quality acquisitions more likely when the company has abundant internal 
resources, which is generally the case for newly public firms. My results show also that 
investors are likely to be overoptimistic about the acquisitions of newly public firms as the 
underperformance is recorded not until years after the acquisition events. I rationalize this with 
the finding of Titman et al. (2004), who argued that investors often underreact to the empire 
building implications, when a firm’s investment expenditures increase, which results as a long-
run underperformance. 
To develop the study further, I would recommend using different methods in calculating 
abnormal returns e.g. using benchmark firms or calculating Fama-French (1993) factors for 
each firm separately. I hope to see additional researches in the acquisition and IPO behavior in 
Europe, which could better explain the slightly different results compared to the U.S. markets. 
It would also be intriguing to see more studies about the country specific features within Europe 
considering IPOs and M&As, which are not considerably discussed in the existing literature. 
Overall, the results indicate new empirical evidence on the importance of acquisition decision 
of newly public firms and offer a new driver for the well-documented IPO long-run 
underperformance within the European markets. 
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